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Introduction  
 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is viewed as one of the largest threats to the 
United States.  Some have even argued that the question is not whether AQAP will strike again, but 
when (Zimmerman 1).   This is why the United States is pursuing counterterrorism measures in 
Yemen, although it has to be noted that the current political situation has complicated those efforts.  
When Obama took office in 2009 he initiated a review on the Yemen policy, this new policy did not 
only target AQAP through kinetic measures, the new strategy also addressed the root causes of 
instability. This through improving governance and the situation of the Yemenis that have enabled 
AQAP to garnish more support amongst the population. The two-pronged strategy consists of 1) 
strengthening the ability of the Yemeni government to promote security and limit the threat from 
extremists, particularly AQAP and 2) reduce the economic crisis in Yemen and increase the provision 
of services, transparency and rule of law. This ‘Yemen model’ is aimed at improving the stability and 
security within Yemen through helping to improve the governance and addressing the socio-economic 
challenges (U.S. department of State). Even though this model seems to be comprehensive, in 2012 
Obama received an open letter from a group of experts such as Christopher Swift and Sheila Carapico 
concerning the U.S. policy in Yemen. The letter stated that the U.S. strategy in Yemen poses a threat 
to the long-term national security goals.  Despite the millions of dollars targeted at development and 
governance projects, the strategy remained one with a kinetic dominance (POMED 1: Zimmerman 1). 
While the Obama administration has viewed this model as an example for counterterrorism operations 
elsewhere, Johnsen poses a critical question: “Why, if the U.S. counterterrorism approach is working 
in Yemen, as Barack Obama’s administration claims, is AQAP still growing?” (Johnsen). 
Inspired by Johnsen’s question this thesis will investigate the Yemen Model. The first prong 
of the strategy, the military element, consists of air strikes by the U.S. and operations by the Yemeni 
military on the ground. The Yemeni intelligence service provides information to the U.S. in order to 
support the air strikes, the air strikes in return weaken AQAP helping the Yemeni ground forces to 
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fight them (U.S. Department of State).  The most controversial part of the U.S. ‘air strategy’ in 
Yemen is the use of drones, the Obama administration has launched an unprecedented amount of 
drone strikes.  The number of drone strikes in Yemen has increased from just one under the Bush 
administration to an estimate of more than 130 drone strikes under Obama (The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism: International Security). The second part of the ‘first prong’ constitutes out 
of cooperation with the Yemeni government. This is translated into the training of Yemeni forces, 
donations of military equipment and the authorization of U.S. strikes on Yemen territory (116 IBP). 
The second prong is materialized through the donations to the Yemeni government and support in 
establishing more durable and responsive institutions (Benjamin). “The logic behind this strategy is 
that while we work with the Yemeni government to constrain and dismantle AQAP, we will also 
assist the Yemeni people in building more durable, responsive institutions and a more hopeful future, 
which in turn will go far in reducing the appeal of violent extremism”  (Benjamin).  
I will argue against the Obama administrations belief that this strategy is successful in Yemen 
and should be pursued during other counterterrorism operations. This because the Yemen model has 
failed to balance the kinetic and development prong of the strategy. In addition to this are there 
various aspects of the strategy that have overlooked the specific conditions in Yemen. I shall argue 
that particularly the U.S. air support is a problematic aspect of the strategy since drones have killed 
Yemeni citizens and are being used by AQAP to create anti-U.S. sentiment.  Furthermore is the actual 
effect of decapitations on terrorist organizations highly contested (Swift 78: Jordan 38). Additionally, 
has the cooperation with the Yemeni government received scepticism. While the U.S. has praised the 
Yemeni government’s cooperation, some have argued that Saleh was more focused on extracting U.S. 
aid instead of fighting AQAP (Johnsen 186: Hemmlich 621). Furthermore does the U.S. support 
aimed at combating the economic crisis in Yemen not seem as prominent, as portrayed in the Yemen 
model. The open letter to Obama comments on this by nothing how “the perception both in the US 
and in Yemen is that US policy is singularly focused on AQAP” (POMED 1). Moreover is the second 
prong aimed at improving the governance in Yemen, this in accordance with the U.S. central strategy 
against al Qaeda that strives to shrink the ungoverned spaces inherent to weak states. This idea 
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presumes that the state is key in defeating al Qaeda and that the Yemeni government wants to 
transition (Detzi 3: Department of Defense 3).  
As illustrated above, there are several problems regarding the ‘Yemen model’, this is why I 
argue that the model is not sufficient and should not be a model for other counterterrorism efforts. The 
theory that the root causes ought to be addressed in fighting terrorism is supported by many theorists 
and critics of the U.S. strategy. This shall be discussed more in depth in the theoretical framework, 
next to other counterterrorism methods. However the realization of this in the Yemen model presumes 
that Saleh was willing to improve the governance in Yemen. Furthermore has the perception remained 
that the military element of the strategy had dominance, it should also be noted that this is the only 
part of the strategy that is still ongoing now in 2016 (Phillips 18-20: Dingli 92-93).  Although the 
Yemen model shortly continued under Hadi, the main focus is on the cooperation with Saleh. 
Therefore the scope of this thesis will begin in 2002, when the first drone strike in Yemen was 
conducted, until 2012 when Saleh resigned (Sharp 78: Zimmerman 5).  
Methods 
 
For this thesis I have drawn upon both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
constituted out of the U.S. government’s policy documents regarding their global counterterrorism 
strategy as well as strategy in Yemen. In addition to various statements and speeches by U.S. officials 
such as Daniel Benjamin, the former coordinator for counterterrorism. I have predominantly used a 
qualitative approach, consulting various secondary sources, namely academic articles regarding 
counterterrorism methods, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen.  This approach has enabled 
me to first structure the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Yemen, followed by the application of this 
strategy and effects on AQAP.  To support the academic articles, I have used various databases that 
investigate the U.S. drone strikes such as the Investigative Bureau of Journalism.  
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Theoretical Framework  
Counterterrorism 
Since this thesis if focused on countering AQAP in Yemen, several counterterrorism methods 
will be discussed. This section will not discuss methods that are aimed at preventing terrorist attacks 
in the immediate future, such as profiling and monitoring suspected terrorists. I shall focus on the 
measures that are aimed at preventing attacks in the near future and at defeating the organization as a 
whole, since this is in accordance with the U.S. strategy in Yemen. Furthermore is there a great 
variety in the nature of terrorist organizations, I will only focus on the methods that are directed at 
combatting ideologically motivated terrorism, because this is relevant for AQAP.  In addition to this is 
the gravity of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy found in kinetic action, therefore a substantial part 
will cover decapitations including the use of drones. This, next to briefly discussing other methods of 
de-radicalization, inhibiting financial flows, pre-emptive action and addressing the root causes.  
De-radicalization  
 Bakker argues that ideally an effective method would be to de-radicalize terrorists.  This 
arguably has a snowball effect since the de-radicalized terrorist can inspire other people to step away 
from terrorism since he has personal experience and more credibility than an outsider.  There are 
instances where terrorists have de-radicalized, both on their own as well as via de-radicalization 
programs.  Some programs focused on de-radicalization others more on disengagement, which meant 
the person would remain their radical views but disengages from terrorism.  Disengagement is more 
feasible than de-radicalization, however both are very difficult to pursue and programs have thus far 
not proven to be key in limiting terrorism (Taspinar 77-79: Bakker 150-159). There are instances where 
people leave terrorism for good, but there are also many examples of people returning to terrorism .In 
addition to this, is it hard to measure, someone can claim to have de-radicalized but in secret continue 
participating in a terrorist organization (Bakker 150-159).  While this method is highly desirable, it is 
difficult to pursue, realize and measure.   
Inhibiting financial flows 
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A more viable option of counterterrorism is inhibiting the financial flows to terrorist 
organizations. The terrorist organizations need to finance their operations, thus limiting the flow of 
financial support could be effective in diminishing operational capability.  “Osama bin Laden’s 
wealth and the support from other Muslim contributors have helped to make al Qaeda as dangerous as 
it has become”. (Lutz and Lutz 287). However this tactic does not seem to be that effective, al Qaeda 
has been able to move some of its financial resources into other commodities that are difficult to trace 
such as for example gold (Lutz and Lutz 288: Raphaeli 74-75).  Although thus far the efforts of 
interrupting financial flows have not been decisive, every disrupted flow contributed to weakening the 
organization and should therefore be pursued (Lutz and Lutz 288).  
Pre-emptive action  
Countries may pursue pre-emptive strikes, which are strikes against for example training 
camps of a terrorist group. This with the aim of disrupting the operational capability of the 
organization. Although there are some instances in which this is an effective approach, it is very 
unlikely that pre-emptive strikes will be effective enough to eliminate the threat of a terrorist 
organization as a whole (Lutz and Lutz 232). Particularly in the case of al Qaeda, it appears that that 
these sort of strikes are not that influential due to the loosely connected networks through which al 
Qaeda operates. Additionally, do strikes like this, as well as decapitation strikes often spark a counter 
reaction, may it be in the far or near future (Lutz and Lutz 234).  
Decapitation  
Another counterterrorism method is the decapitation of leaders of terrorist organizations. This 
probably is the most controversial method discussed by Bakker. An example of this is the killing of 
Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda (Bakker 160). The method of decapitation is part of the 
United States counterterrorism strategy in Yemen, where it has been successful in killing Anwar Al 
Awlaki, a prominent member of AQAP (Eleftheriadou 413). Decapitation does not necessarily entail 
the killing of terrorist leaders, it can also refer to the arrest of leaders or key members. The aim is to 
take out leadership in the hope that it will weaken or even defeat the organization. Much of the 
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research regarding the effectiveness of decapitation is anecdotal and derived from single case studies 
(Bakker 162-167).   There is a mixed view on whether decapitation is an effective counterterrorism 
method.  Patrick Johnston argues that leadership decapitation is an effective method, claiming that it 
decreases the intensity and frequency of attacks, increases the prospects of terminating war and raises 
the chances of government victory (Johnston 50). He does note however that decapitation is effective 
as part of a larger campaign.   Bryan Price agrees with this and states that decapitation is effective and 
should not be seen as a short-term measure (Price 216).  
In contradiction to Johnston’s belief that decapitation is an effective method, Pape and Jordan 
argue this method ineffective. Furthermore does Jordan note how Johnston used ten years as marker 
in his research whereas she argues that the effect of decapitation decreases once a group passes the 
twenty-year threshold, explaining the difference in conclusion (Jordan 10-11). She argues that the 
organizations most regularly targeted by such a method is generally unaffected by it. Jordan does note 
that in the immediate aftermath of decapitation an organization is temporarily weakened which affects 
its operational capacity. However, using Al-Qaeda as an example, she claims that due to its 
‘bureaucratic organization and communal support’, the organization has been able to withstand 
decapitations (Jordan 38). When compared with organizations that did not experience decapitation, 
she concludes that the decapitated organizations did not have a particular higher decline rate, hence, 
this method does not seem to effectively counter terrorism. Furthermore does Jordan even suggest that 
decapitation can have a counterproductive effect, strengthening the organization. This due to the 
discontent as a consequence of possible collateral damage, which could inspire retaliation that is often 
supported by the general public (Bakker 167: Price 218).   
Drones  
Both pre-emptive strikes and decapitations can be conducted through the use of drones. There 
is a great debate however about drones, in the ethics as well as legal sphere. Whereas proponents 
argue that they are very precise and enable the killing of terrorist with little collateral impacts. Others 
have argued that drones are indiscriminate and unlawful (Bakker 169). There is significant evidence 
that report civilian casualties as a consequence of drone strikes.  Whereas it is arguable that indeed 
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drones are more precise than missiles, the civilian casualties should be taken into account when 
assessing the effectiveness of drones as counterterrorism measure (Bakker 171). As illustrated above, 
decapitation or pre-emptive strikes do not seem to sufficiently impact terrorist organizations and it is 
therefore worth questioning the use of drones.  Especially the extent to which the Obama 
administration has been relying on this technology, with more than 500 drone strikes conducted thus 
far (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism). As Bergen and Rothenberg note: “They have become 
the lens through which US foreign policy is understood” (Bergen and Rothenberg 1). 
Drones are controversial because they open the debate in various disciplines. The killing of 
civilians, despite the fact that the technology is claimed to be highly accurate, has sparked discussions 
regarding the legitimacy, ethics and legality of targeted killings (Bergen and Rothenberg 1).  That the 
drones are controlled from a base on the other side of the world has hinted towards the possibilities of 
remote warfare. In addition to this, has the fact that drones are being deployed outside of traditional 
warzones raised questions regarding the changing nature of warfare.  Despite the controversy, the 
drones are still being widely used and it is understandably why. This technology is able to stay in the 
air for a rather long period of time, which enables the operatives to get a better understanding of what 
is happening on the ground. In addition to this, are the chances of casualties minimal from the United 
States side of the drones, due to the fact that the operatives are controlling the drones from bases 
abroad (Blanchard 120-124 : Bergen and Rothenberg 1).  However, the receiving end of the drone 
strikes is less positive about this technology, the civilian casualties are a highly problematic aspect 
that have contributed to a culture of fear (Bakker 171).  
Addressing the root causes  
Addressing the root causes that motivate people to join terrorist organizations is argued to be 
an effective method. This to the extent that reforms would increase for example the provision of 
services, address poverty and increase governance.  These have been identified as push factors for 
people to support various terrorist organizations since these sometimes aim to fulfil the role that the 
government has neglected. This will decrease the chances of people resorting to terrorist 
organizations, however it does not combat the ideology. Pursuing reforms that will be deemed 
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sufficient by an organization as al Qaeda will prove to be very difficult. For example AQAP aims to 
pursue the establishment of an Islamic caliphate cannot be achieved through some reforms and is also 
not favoured by governments.  Therefore reforms that address the grievances that motivate people to 
join/support terrorist organization are feasible but reforms that address the underlying motivation for 
engaging in the terrorist activities prove to be difficult (Lutz & Lutz 234). Socioeconomic reform 
programs that dress the roots of grievances that motivate people to join terrorist organizations are 
considered to be the best method against terrorism (Lutz & Lutz 236). “Since poverty and ignorance 
provide a breeding ground for radicalism, socioeconomic development appears compelling as an 
effective antidote” (Taspinar 75) However this is also a very costly and difficult method that takes 
time and requires the willingness of the local population and government. 
Conclusion  
There are many different methods to counter terrorism and it appears that none of them will 
defeat an organization on its own. Therefore a multi-pronged strategy is the best way to combat 
terrorism. It should be noted that there is a great debate about the effectiveness of some elements such 
as decapitation and pre-emptive strikes. These methods tend to limit the operational capability of a 
terrorist organization in the short-term. However these methods do nothing to counter the underlying 
motivations that incentivize people to join terrorist organizations. Furthermore are there side-effects 
involved which should also be taken into account when assessing the effectiveness. Particularly 
drones are controversial due to their extensive use by the Obama administration and reports of civilian 
casualties. Addressing the root causes that motivate people to join terrorist organizations appears to be 
an effective method, however it ought to be noted that one can combat the socio-economic grievances 
but not the ideology. In addition to this, does such a method take a lot of time and money and is 
cooperation with the local government necessary which could complicate the efforts.  
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Chapter 1: Promoting Security and Minimizing the Threat of AQAP  
 
The first prong of the strategy in Yemen is concerned with strengthening “the government of 
Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists within its 
border” (U.S. Department of State).  This part of the strategy is mostly ‘military’ oriented and has 
focused on training troops in Yemen, the U.S. has even helped Yemen to establish a coast guard. The 
U.S. has also provided technical support, equipment and training to Yemen’s anti-terrorism unit (109 
IBP: Sharp 12). In return for the U.S. aid, the Yemeni government shared intelligence with the U.S. in 
order for them to locate AQAP members and pursue air attacks (Eleftheriadou 414). The most 
controversial element of the U.S. strategy is the use of drones, which have been featured in AQAP 
propaganda.  In order to understand why the U.S. is pursuing AQAP in Yemen, the organization shall 
be discussed shortly, followed by an analysis of the first prong of the Yemen model.  
An introduction to AQAP 
 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is regarded as the most dangerous al Qaeda branch (Terrill 
1: Sharp 83).  AQAP is responsible for attacks such as the USS Cole bombing in 2000 and the 
attempted ‘underwear bomber’ attack in 2009 (Zimmerman 5). Due to the loss of the al Qaeda Afghan 
base, it became more of a challenge to control the various al Qaeda groups across the region. This 
resulted into franchising, creating local al Qaeda branches with particular strategies and areas of 
operation based on their locations. This was also the case for AQAP, who according to Eleftheriadou 
‘followed a largely independent course determined by local dynamics’. The current AQAP is the 
result of a merger between al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and al Qaeda in Yemen in 2009.  The Saudi 
affiliate had been trying to gain greater influence within Saudi Arabia, however by 2007 AQAP had 
proven to be ineffective in gaining popular support (Harris 75). Due to the pressure from the Saudi 
government and its counterinsurgency, AQAP was ineffective in establishing effective command and 
control.  This led the group to relocate to Yemen, which according to deputy AQAP leader Said Ali 
al-Shihri offered a protected place that was not weak from a security point of view (Eleftheriadou 411 
:Terrill 1: Faulkner and Gray 4). 
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The objectives of AQAP can be categorized in long and short-term objectives. The 
organization is aimed at creating conditions that result into the U.S. and West to cease their support 
for the Yemeni government and inhibit their influence in Yemen through the means of terrorist 
attacks. In the short term AQAP ought to maintain their sanctuary within Yemen to support the global 
al Qaeda. In the longer term, AQAP’s fundamental goal is the restoration of the caliphate in the 
largest part of dar al-Islam.  To establish the caliphate, control over the most important religious sites 
of Sunni Islam is necessary, meaning that Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem are aspired to be controlled. 
This also explains the ‘gravity’ of jihadi military effort that is found in the Arabian Peninsula 
(Eleftheriadou 410: Swift 77).   
It is understandable that the United States feels a threat from AQAP, it is evident that this 
organization sees them as the ‘far enemy. For example in response to the death of Osama bin Laden, 
AQAP announced that they will intensify the global Jihad. As Abu Nasir has stated, the killing of bin 
Laden does not mean the end for al Qaeda. He even argues that the death of their leader has inspired a 
strong counter-reaction. “What is waiting for you is far greater and more dangerous, and will then 
count your regrets, wishing for the days of Osama” (Schone). Because AQAP has its own leadership, 
the death of Osama did not severely influence this branch of al-Qaeda, at least not to the extent that is 
desirable to the U.S. (Benton and Attwater viii).  The fact that al Qaeda had trouble garnishing 
support in Saudi Arabia inspired AQAP to change their focus from the near enemy towards the far 
enemy, in the hope to increase their legitimacy. Furthermore have the occupations of other Middle 
Eastern countries such as Iraq contributed to the anti-western/U.S. sentiment that has also inspired the 
attacks on the far enemy (Eleftheriadou 411: Johnsen). 
The U.S. airstrikes   
 
One of the ways by which the United States is trying to pursue AQAP, is through air attacks. 
As mentioned earlier, the Obama administration is characterized by the extensive use of drones. Why 
this part of the strategy is particularly controversial is due to the fact that there have been reports of 
civilian deaths. These have been used by AQAP to strengthen the anti-U.S. sentiment and recruit 
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(Sohlman 253: Swift 79).  Despite the claims of the Obama administration that no strike is conducted 
unless there is near certainty, there are extensive reports denoting civilian casualties (The White 
House). Investigations by New America currently estimate the death toll of civilians at 87-93, and 
Long War Journal reports around 105 civilian deaths. The discrepancy is a result of the difficulty of 
verification (International Security: Roggio and Barry). The civilian deaths are problematic since they 
do not only impact AQAP but also the local population. As one tribesman noted after the U.S. 
targeted a member of AQAP with ‘collateral damage’: “You see the heads of those were killed here 
and there; you see children. And you cannot tell if this meat belongs to animals or human beings” 
(Johnsen 252). Such events, according to Johnsen are fruitful for AQAP to base their propaganda on.  
Drones are featured in AQAP propaganda films depicting AQAP members who survived attacks and 
condemn the civilian casualties. Such narratives are effective in creating public discontent and 
delegitimizing the regime (Swift 78: FrontLine: Al Qaeda in Yemen).  
In reaction to scholars such as Johnsen stating that the U.S. strikes are being used as 
recruitment tools, a report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute notes that his logic is horribly 
backwards.  They stated that “The U.S. deploys drones where terrorist go …. The U.S. does not 
deploy drones to countries for the purpose of shooting at innocent people in the hopes of creating 
terrorists” (Watts and Cilluffo 8). The report furthermore notes that the reason why AQAP uses such 
events as propaganda method is to enrage local populations with the hope of diminishing the 
occurrence of such attacks. Additionally the report mentions that critics such as Scahill and Johnsen, 
see the AQAP’s use of drone strikes in propaganda as a justification for an end to this tactic (Watts 
and Cilluffo 8). However I would argue Johnsen and Scahill are not against drone strikes if they 
effectively kill terrorists, they are merely concerned with the civilian casualties and the possibility of 
AQAP profiting from such strikes.   
Additionally, according to fieldwork by Swift, it appears to be economic incentives opposed 
to popular resentment that is the main motivator for people to join AQAP. (Swift 79). It seems that the 
media exaggerates the extent to which the drone strikes and side-effects inspire people to join the 
organization. Furthermore was the biggest problem with drones according to various tribesmen, that 
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they remind the Yemenis that they do not have the capability to solve their own problems. As one of 
Swift’s interviewees noted, if these were Yemeni drones instead of American ones, there would not be 
a problem. Swift observed a similar sentiment from a member of the Yemeni Socialist Party who 
states that people do not resent the drone strikes if the target is a terrorist, however people resent the 
fact that outsiders are involved (Swift 81).  President Saleh seemed to be aware of this sentiment 
when he allowed the first drone strike in Yemen. He agreed to this on the condition that the strike 
would remain a secret. The U.S. drone shot the car where Hariti was in, killing him and five others. 
Soon after that a Yemeni team arrived to clean up the area so it would not be evident that this was the 
result of a drone strike. However the U.S. did not maintain its word and relatively soon after the kills 
were confirmed, the deputy Secretary of Defense went on air and took credit for the strikes. It is hard 
not to draw a connection to the fact this happened two days before the US midterm elections (Johnsen 
123).  Illustrating that the cooperation with the U.S. and Yemeni is not flawless, both states have 
different initial objectives.  
Although there is quite a substantial controversy about the use of drones, Terrill argues that 
they have played a crucial role in 2012 during the summer offensive.  The Yemeni army had been 
severely damaged by AQAP’s insurgent force, resulting in 185 deaths.  The fight between AQAP and 
the Yemeni army intensified, leading to many deaths in the Yemeni army in comparison to AQAP 
casualties (Terill 44).   However the Yemeni government managed to fight back, arguably due to the 
U.S. drones that supported the Yemeni ground forces. At such a sensitive time, during a political 
transition, the defeat of the Yemeni military could have easily led to a great escalation within Yemen. 
As Terill argues, this might have resulted into the collapse of the government (Terill 6). Furthermore 
assessing drones purely on their intended goal: killing the enemy, it can be argued to be an effective 
tool.  However it is still a short term strategy and the consequences should be taken into account, the 
civilian deaths are highly problematic (Bakker 171: Faulkner and Gray 12).  Moreover is the effect of 
the strikes on AQAP’s operational capabilities questionable. The impact of particularly targeted 
strikes in the past does not appear to influence AQAP to the desired extent.  
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The Influence of Decapitations on AQAP 
 
The effectiveness of decapitation on terrorist groups is contested. Arguably one of the major 
successes was the first drone strike in Yemen.  Harithi, the leader of al Qaeda in Yemen was killed 
during this first drone strike that took place in 2002. Due to close cooperation with the Yemeni 
government, Harithi’s replacement Rabi’i was arrested, followed by the imprisonment of the last 
major al-Qaeda leader Ahdal.  With the removal of al-Qaeda’s top leaders, the organization’s 
structure was removed and the threat of al Qaeda severely diminished (Johnsen 132).  By 2006, the 
United States aid to Yemen dropped to a new low since al Qaeda was no longer perceived as a threat 
(Johnsen 186).  However, in 2006 several prisoners escaped from a military intelligence prison in 
Sana’a, amongst these prisoners were Nasir Al-Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi. In prison they had 
carefully started planning and recruiting for the re-emergence of al Qaeda, which when they escaped 
enabled them to re-establish the organization (Eleftheridaou 416: Faulkner and Gray 4: Johnsen 161-
162).  The year after, Rabi’i was killed which enabled al-Wahayshi to take control of rebuilding al 
Qaeda.  He formed the strategy that transformed the organization to its current structure and workings.  
Then in 2009, the Saudi affiliate and the Yemeni affiliate merged forming al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula as it is known today (Johnsen 207).   AQAP managed to grow from around 300 members in 
2009 to an estimated 1000 in 2013 (U.S. Department of State).   
There have been some successes in killing important members of al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, such as the killing of Anwar al Awlaki and Said al-Shirhi, both high profile members. 
However thus far, AQAP has recovered from such decapitations as the re-birth of al Qaeda in 2006 
demonstrated.  Adding to this, is Johnsen sceptical about the effect Awlaki’s death had on the 
organization. He does not see Awlaki as such a crucial member of AQAP as for example Al-
Wahayshi or al-Raymi (Shane: Johnsen).  As introduced in the theoretical framework, there is a great 
debate concerning the effectiveness of decapitation on terrorist organizations.  Whereas for example 
Johnston sees it as an effective measure against terrorism, others as Pape and Jordan disagree. The 
scholars do agree on the fact that in the direct aftermath of decapitation, an organization is temporarily 
weakened which affects its operational capacity and hence temporarily diminishes the chances of an 
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attack on the United States (Jordan 38).  The conclusion that can be drawn form this is that air attacks 
can be useful in limiting the capabilities of AQAP in the short-term, however the side-effects such as 
civilian deaths should be taken into account. On the longer-term, particularly “the cost effectiveness 
of drone usage may ultimately become too expensive or too controversial to continue without looking 
into more comprehensive approaches to defeating AQAP” (Faulkner and Gray 13)  
The Cooperation with the Yemeni Government and Intelligence 
 
The decapitations and other air strike attacks by the U.S. are largely dependent on Yemeni 
intelligence. This is where the next problem arises. The U.S.-led drone campaign has no autonomous 
intelligence mechanism, but depends on intelligence from the Yemeni government. This is often 
inaccurate and inadequate both due to the lack of state penetration in various regions as well as a 
result of AQAP’s targeting of intelligence officers.  AQAP has publically executed informants in 
order to intimidate the population and warn them against pursuing such intelligence collection.  
(Eleftheriadou 412-414). Furthermore has the Yemeni government not always been that successful in 
delivering correct intelligence. For example in 2010 the U.S. received a tip from allies from the 
Yemeni intelligence regarding the location of al-Shabwani, a member of al Qaeda.  However instead 
of killing Aidh al-Shabwani, the U.S. missile targeted Jabir al-Shabwani who was the deputy governor 
of Marib. Some analysts viewed this incident in the light of Saleh using U.S. force to target a political 
rival (Johnsen 264). Although not perfect, the intelligence by the Yemeni services is crucial for the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy since they do not have their own intelligence on the ground. The 
reliance on the Yemeni forces and Saleh appears to be a risky part of the strategy.  
That the cooperation with the Yemeni government deserves some scepticism is also evident 
regarding the training of the security forces. The U.S. training of the Yemeni Special Forces and 
counterterrorism units is aimed at countering AQAP (Serafino 6). It can be argued that strengthening 
the Yemeni forces prior to political development can serve in the advantage of Saleh and support his 
authoritarian rule.  Yemen’s political system, prior to the current upheaval can be best described as 
pluralized authoritarianism.  Meaning that the regime is authoritarian but grants little, restricted room 
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to establish ‘alternative institutionalized power’ (Phillips 4).   “President Saleh has been able to use 
the military and security services as a baseline guarantee against a serious challenge to his power or 
against the growth of competing institutions ”(Phillips 68). Therefore it is worth questioning the 
strengthening of the Yemeni services since the coercive power can also be used to fight internal 
enemies aside from AQAP. 
 President Saleh managed to stay in power for over 30 years, meanwhile the long-term 
structural resources and economic challenges worsened during his reign. The Arab Spring affected 
Yemen, the people wanted to remove president Saleh, who had ignored the socio-economic 
deteriorating situation. The protests turned violent in mid-2011 when street battles erupted between 
the supporters and opponents of Saleh in various cities across Yemen.  As a consequence of these 
battles, the government forces distributed across the country were called back to protect the regime. 
Hence, the forces were not focussed on battling AQAP anymore and this resulted into a security 
vacuum, consequently AQAP was able to consolidate more territory (Sharp 31: Zimmerman 47).  The 
reign of Saleh and the cooperation with the United States will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
next chapter.   
Concluding, it appears that the first prong of the Yemen model has some problematic aspects. 
The use of drones has resulted into various side-effects such as the civilians casualties. In addition to 
this has AQAP used the ‘failures’ of the strikes to create anti-U.S. sentiment. The degree to which the 
drone strikes have affected AQAP’s operational capability is limited, arguably the first drone strike 
was very effective. However after the merger, even the killings of so-claimed important members as 
Anwar al-Awlaki have merely impacted the organization. Furthermore has the relationship between 
the U.S. government and Yemeni government complicated the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The 
intelligence is not always accurate and the willingness of president Saleh to cooperate for the greater 
good of defeating AQAP is questionable. In addition to this, has strengthening the Yemeni forces 
prior to political development benefitted Saleh, as became evident during the protests in 2011.  
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Chapter 2: Improving Governance and the Socio-economic Situation in Yemen  
 
The second part of the strategy is focused on the serious political and economic issues that the country 
faces in the longer term.  As Zimmerman has observed “AQAP is growing because of Yemen’s 
internal political and military crises, which spring from deep-rooted grievances among the population. 
No meaningful strategy to defeat AQAP can ignore those crises or grievances, however superficially 
appealing it might be to focus only on killing terrorists.”(Zimmerman 4).  As discussed earlier, 
Yemen is coping with both political and economic problems, these problems have enabled AQAP to 
develop which is why they are key elements in trying to defeat them.   The second prong shows that 
the U.S. government is aware of this and has attempted a strategy that addresses this issues. However 
it can be argued that the U.S. strategy does not effectively do this.  The rule of Saleh, the socio-
economic conditions and the presence of the tribes have all complicated the efforts of the U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy. These specific characteristics have either been ignored in the strategy or not 
incorporated sufficiently.   
The second prong is crucial for effectively combatting AQAP in the long-run. Addressing the 
root causes that have enabled AQAP in Yemen are key to defeating them. On this subject, the U.S. 
policymakers, Yemeni experts and counterterrorism experts agree. However the problem lies with the 
execution of this part of the strategy.  As noted earlier in the open letter to Obama, the perception 
remains that the U.S. is solely targeting AQAP and does not ‘care’ about Yemen.  Addressing the root 
causes is both in the interest of limiting the influence of AQAP as well as to establish a sentiment that 
the U.S. is not just using Yemen as a battleground. (POMED 2) 
This part of the strategy is predominantly materialized through the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  USAID signed a $31 million dollar bilateral assistance 
agreement with the Yemeni government in 2009, with a prospect of $121 million assistance over the 
coming three years, if the funds permit to do so.  The USAID strategy for 2009-2012 hypothesized 
“that addressing the development needs of underserved communities is causally related to improving 
political and social stability” (USAID 2).  The strategy included for example small-scale community 
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projects aimed at improving infrastructure, food security and agricultural productivity. This with the 
aim of creating employment opportunities and an increase in the accessibility and delivery of goods 
and services.  Furthermore did the strategy aim at increasing governance capacities and mitigating the 
drivers of instability. This through enhancing public policies and institutions, with the hope of 
establishing community-based institutions that strengthen local political participation and the increase 
the chance of “locally driven solutions” (USAID 2-9).  This strategy seems to be comprehensive but 
as argued in the open letter, the dominance of the strategy is found in the military measures (POMED 
1). In addition to this does this part of the strategy face some domestic complications in Yemen. This 
will be illustrated through first discussing the rule of Saleh, followed by how AQAP uses the socio-
economic grievances. Moreover will the role of the tribes in Yemeni society and their relation to 
AQAP and counterterrorism efforts be highlighted.  These factors all complicate the U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts and highlight the flaws in the USAID strategy, with which this chapter shall 
conclude.  
The Rule of Saleh: ‘Dancing on the heads of snakes’ 
 
 It is argued that president Saleh has neglected the socio-economic problems within the 
country and has been accused of corruption.  However it should also be noted that Saleh did not have 
an easy task. The Republic of Yemen was established just 26 years ago, following the unification of 
the Yemen Arab Republic (North) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South).   The 
former North was previously ruled by the GPC, which was nationalistic in nature. The South was 
ruled by the YSP, who identified itself as Marxist. Phillips claims the YSP was the most 
“ideologically radical ruling party in the Arab world” (Phillips 6).  Hence the unification of Yemen 
constituted out of the merger of two very different political systems (Phillips 5). Saleh, who was a 
YAR military officer and ruler of North Yemen, became the first president of the Republic of Yemen.  
Due to the fact that Saleh was from the North, there still remains a sentiment that the North 
politically, economically and culturally dominates the country (Sharp 76: Stracke 9-10).  Saleh is 
more than aware of the complicated situation in Yemen and has referred to ruling the country as: 
“dancing on the heads of snakes”. This refers to the many different parties in Yemen that seek to gain 
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influence, such as various tribes, Southern secessionists,  opposition parties, militant jihadists and 
even Saleh’s own relatives and the inability to focus on all these parties. Focusing on one ‘snake, will 
take the focus off another ‘snake. (Whitaker)  
As noted, Saleh has been accused of corruption and using foreign aid for its own benefits. 
Yemen scores very high on corruption indexes and it is viewed as one of the root causes of the 
stagnation of Yemen’s economy (Transparency International: Boucek and Alkebsi). Yemen remains 
one of the poorest countries in the world. Saleh has used the little oil funds of Yemen, “to buy tribal 
loyalties, expand Yemen’s bureaucracy with patronage jobs, and depress energy prices.” (Sharp 20). 
Some have even argued that the Yemeni government is dependent on the threat of al Qaeda to secure 
financial aid, as Johnsen noted: “without al Qaeda, Yemen was just one more poor country” (Johnsen 
186: Hemmlich 621). The Bush administration had donated millions of dollars in money and military 
equipment to Yemen.  It was mostly Saleh’s relatives and allies in the army that benefitted from the 
U.S. aid, contributing to the regime’s system of patronage (Johnsen 179). Simply put, Saleh seemed to 
want money, not reforms (Johnsen 181.)    
This is not to state that the cooperation between the United States and the Yemeni 
government does not have its perks. In a testimony by Jeffrey D. Feltman in 2010 (Assistant Secretary 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) he notes how indeed the government of Yemen has been inconsistent 
in addressing the threat of AQAP, however that “recent intensive engagement appears to have had 
positive results” (U.S. Department of State). Yemen has carried out multiple operations with the aim 
of disrupting AQAP’s capability and increased the pressure on the organization. The success of the 
cooperation was particularly evident in 2002-2003 when three of al Qaeda’s top leaders were either 
killed or captured, declining al Qaeda’s operational capabilities severely.  The cooperation with the 
Yemeni government with regards to ground forces and intelligence have been key to the strategy in 
Yemen.  
How AQAP profits from the socio-economic conditions in Yemen  
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 Why addressing the root causes is so important for countering AQAP in Yemen is because 
the organization has used the socio-economic grievances in Yemen to increase their appeal. (Phillips 
17: Sharp 20).  Since the reunification in 1990, the poverty levels have nearly doubled, currently 
around half of the population lives below the poverty line (Phillips 17: Swift 79). The poverty in 
Yemen is both the cause and consequence of many problems that the population faces. The 
educational levels in Yemen are rather low, 39% of the population over fifteen is illiterate.  This 
combined with the situation of the country that includes scarce resources, drought and worsening 
climate conditions, have contributed to the high unemployment and the economic grievances (Lackner 
9-10) 
 As noted earlier, it is more economic inducement instead of popular resentment that creates 
appeal towards AQAP.  Several tribal leaders interviewed by Swift, observe how many of the 
unemployed teenagers with little education nor status are incentivized by what AQAP has to offer 
them. They for example promise a new rifle, a car and a relatively pleasant salary.  Poor and/or 
unemployed adults are also targeted and attracted to AQAP for financial aid. Thus the high 
underemployment and poverty levels create more appeal for organizations as AQAP (Swift 79). 
Therefore the deteriorating socio-economic conditions within Yemen that have been ignored by the 
Saleh government have enabled AQAP to garnish more popular support. AQAP has sought to build 
connections with the tribes through the provision of basic services in combination with the narrative 
of a common enemy: the Yemeni government, this has increased the appeal to AQAP (Harris 75).  
Johnsen even referred to AQAP as “the most representative organization in Yemen. It transcends 
class, tribe, and regional identity in a way that no other organization or political party does” (Johnsen 
12).  However Phillips notes that AQAP is representative in the sense that like no other organization 
they have been able to construct a narrative of popular discontent that has a greater reach than any 
other political organization in Yemen. However the organization has not been able to translate this 
into a political program.  (Phillips 7).  
  Prior to 2010 AQAP functioned primarily as a terrorist organization, but it has developed 
and expended their operations to capture and rule territory. Specifically in areas where the Yemeni 
22 
 
government has little or no influence, AQAP did these using their insurgent arm: Ansar al-Sharia 
(Terrill 9).  The movement is often compared to a Taliban-like movement and supports the growing 
influence of AQAP. Ansar al Sharia has seized territories, mostly throughout the Abyan governorate. 
As Gregory Johnsen notes in reference to Ansar al Sharia’s control   “It has claimed that it is 
following the Taliban model in attempting to provide services and Islamic government where the 
central government in Yemen has left a vacuum.” (Johnsen) These services for example include the 
restoration of roads and electricity, distribution of food and security patrol surrounding the city and 
the establishment of sharia courts (Scahill).   This is not to state that the conditions under AQAP 
controlled area are pleasant. It is more likely that the fear installed into locals is the driving force 
behind the for example low crime rates.  As journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad noted during his travel to 
AQAP controlled area, after the hands from three thieves were cut off, no one dared to steal anymore 
(Frontline: Al Qaeda in Yemen : Johnsen 279). Although the socio-economic situation has enabled 
AQAP to garnish more popular support, it has not incentivized that many people to join AQAP.  
There are millions of people in Yemen that live in poverty and just around a thousand AQAP fighters. 
This due to AQAP’s methods that do not find appeal amongst the majority of the population (Harris 
1). Although people might not have joined AQAP, they have also not resisted their presence, enabling 
AQAP to seize more territory.  This creation of mutual dependency with the Yemeni tribes is part of 
has enabled AQAP to gain more influence.   
The Tribes and Counterterrorism Efforts 
 
The tribes in Yemen play very large role in society. The majority of the population lives in 
rural areas, where it is more often the tribes who receive legitimacy to govern than the state.   These 
well-armed tribes have at times inhibited the government from pursuing its tasks of extracting natural 
resources, punishing criminals and even construct government buildings (Phillips 19).   The strategy 
by AQAP’s al-Wahayshi has focused on three prongs: engagement, empowerment and dependency 
among Yemen’s tribes.  Much of this engagement is pursued through Ansar al-Shari’a, which 
according to Abu Zubayr Adel al-Abab (senior AQAP official) is the name used to introduce 
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‘themselves’ to the people. Due to the controversy around al Qaeda, this popular front is more 
effective in promoting AQAP’s activities in tribal areas.  
AQAP understands that trying to dominate the tribes through coercion is not as effective as 
creating networks of mutual dependency. Through the provision of salaries and for example public 
services, AQAP discourages people from searching for other sources of patronage, hence this benefits 
the tribe.  AQAP has furthermore been effective in both identifying and empowering weaker shaykhs 
through which they were able to operate within the tribal structures (Swift 2-3).  Zimmerman has 
identified AQAP’s strategy in a similar way as Swift, and furthermore highlights the establishment of 
a territory outside of the Yemeni government’s control (Zimmerman 19). The fact that Yemen is an 
“impoverished mountainous country with a weak central government” makes it a very interesting 
location for terrorist organizations (Sharp 76). Next to creating these networks of dependency, AQAP 
also deploys a strategy in which they exploit the possibility of inter-tribal conflict.  AQAP recruits 
members from one tribe and deploys them within the territory of another, because any attack to its 
own forces will therefore lead to a reaction on the ‘victim’s forces. This prospect makes it less likely 
for weaker tribes to challenge AQAP’s presence (Swift 77).  
From an ideological perspective the tribes are not aligned with AQAP, however through the 
creation of mutual dependency the organization has been able to limit resistance from tribes (Day 261: 
Swift 2-3).  That the tribes are crucial for the counterterrorism efforts in Yemen is undeniable, 
however again the USAID strategy presumes that the ‘communities’ are willing to cooperate with the 
United States development efforts. The cooperation with local factors is key to pursuing development 
in Yemen and to establish ‘small-scale community’ projects (USAID 2-9).  However the extent to 
which the tribes are willing to cooperate with the U.S. is highly questionable. The cooperation with 
the United States might not be valued by all shayks and tribesmen, consequently this could be 
compromising for their leadership.  “The more a shaykh’s ruling strays from both precedent and 
popular opinion, the greater the risk to his authority and influence” (Koehler-Derrick 88). The U.S. 
presence and particularly the drones strikes are fuelling anti-American sentiment, some see the drones 
as violating national Yemeni sovereignty (Sohlman 253: Swift 81).  In addition to this, is the U.S. 
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support for Israeli politics that deny Palestinians rights, another reason for anti-U.S. sentiment (Day 
261).  Hence supporting the Americans, appears to be an unpopular choice for shayks. 
The flaws of the USAID strategy  
 
 In theory this strategy appears to be comprehensive and sufficient to combat AQAP in 
Yemen, however in practicality this part of the strategy made some problematic assumptions. First of 
all, this strategy assumes that Saleh was willing to pursue ‘good governance’.  Unlike other areas 
where the United States has been active,  “Yemen provides the first instance where a tangible threat 
from al Qaeda resides in a sovereign, ‘partner’ nation where the U.S. has neither the political control, 
nor the military resources to transform the state and pursue al Qaeda” (Detzi 5).  This means that the 
cooperation with Saleh was a crucial element of the Yemen model, in trying to improve the 
governance.  I would argue that 30 years of authoritarian rule, that largely neglected the deteriorating 
situation in Yemen does not illustrate a great willingness to improve the situation.  The strong 
presence of a patronage system has challenged the U.S. efforts in addressing the root causes and 
improving governance.  There are no state institutions present that could help reduce the strength of 
the patronage system (Phillips 18). In addition to this did the elite not show a willingness to reform. 
As Phillips observes, progressive changes would have very likely remove resources and power from 
the circle of elites that have supported Saleh. Hence, this seemed undesirable for both Saleh as well as 
his elites (Phillips 17). 
Furthermore does the strategy also assume that the allocated donations will be materialized as 
well as that there are institutions that can effectively use the donor aid. However the donations of aid 
prove both difficult to deliver as well as to distribute. Nabil Ali Shaiban highlights how there is much 
donor aid on paper, but in practice little has actually been donated to Yemen.  He notes how “many of 
the government agencies in Yemen lack the technical capacity to process aid quickly and effectively” 
(Shaiban).  Furthermore does he argue that the U.S. government has overlooked the capabilities of 
institutions such as the Social Fund for Development and Public Works program that have been 
enabled with support of the World Bank. Adding to this have the high levels of corruption and 
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potential aid mismanagement led to concerns of other donors, hence there is a great gap between 
allocation and materialization.   So despite the great amount of allocations, little has been donated and 
according the USAID, there is not enough aid present. As stated in the strategy, USAID has identified 
eight governorates that particularly require attention, however “resources are insufficient to sustain 
operations in all eight governorates” (USAID 11).   
Concluding it can be argued that the current strategy does not take some elements into account 
that are characteristic for Yemeni politics, such as the tribes and the patronage system. “Western 
chances of encouraging a more inclusive political system are questionable. In the long term, only a 
fundamental domestic restructuring of the political system to become much more inclusive will lead 
to stability (Phillips 1).” The specific situations in Yemen complicate the efforts of the USAID 
strategy in Yemen that makes some crucial assumptions. For example the Yemeni institutions that 
could effectively use the donor aid are not present, cooperation with tribes is assumed although this is 
also not a guarantee. Most importantly does the strategy assume that Saleh was willing to improve 
governance.  As noted earlier the extent to which Saleh was a willing partner in improving the 
situation in Yemen, is highly questionable. Sharp argues that with Hadi, the new president of Yemen, 
the United States has a more willing partner to cooperate in the fight against AQAP (Sharp 86). 
However currently Hadi is not able to support the U.S. in pursuing a counterterrorism strategy as a 
result of the political situation.  Yemen is in turmoil and there are ongoing clashes with the nominal 
government and particularly the Saleh-allied Houthi forces, this in combination with the presence of 
both AQAP and ISIS. As of the time of writing, there are UN-led talks taking place in Kuwait with 
the hopes of reaching a solution to stabilize the current situation in Yemen (Sharp 78: Zimmerman 5: 
Johnson 278). The lack of a central government has inhibited the strategy from preceding, however 
the drone strikes are still ongoing (Zimmerman 3).  
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Conclusion 
 
Concluding, the U.S. Yemen Model has not been as effective as portrayed by the Obama 
Administration. The idea that this counterterrorism strategy should be applied to other countries 
seems inefficient. This has become evident following an analysis of the specific characteristics within 
Yemen, such as the rule of Saleh, the socio-economic conditions and the presence of tribes.  The two 
prongs of the Yemen Model both have some problematic elements that have limited the blow to 
AQAP.  The concerns of the critics in the open letter to Obama seem to be justified. The prominent 
part of the strategy appeared to be the military one, opposed to more focus on addressing the root 
causes.  
The first prong that was predominantly military focused and had much gravity towards 
decapitation as an effective counterterrorism method. However, the extent to which decapitations 
have influenced AQAP is rather limited, the organization has managed to revive every time thus far. 
In addition to this has particularly the use of drones sparked much criticism. The deaths of civilians 
and dependence on Yemeni intelligence are worrying aspects of this strategy. As illustrated, the 
cooperation with the Yemeni government has not always been flawless, from both the U.S. side as the 
Yemeni side. Saleh appeared to be a leader who was more interested in balancing the threat of AQAP 
in order to receive international support than to actually defeat the organization. In addition to this has 
he used the security services that have been strengthened by the U.S. donations, to protect his rule 
during the 2011 protests.  
The second prong was concerned with addressing the socio-economic conditions that Saleh 
had ignored for years. The fact that these conditions have deteriorated to that extent during this rule, 
demonstrate a lack of willingness to improve the situation in the country. The USAID strategy 
assumes that the Yemeni government is a willing partner that wants to change the political system. 
This assumption appears to be incorrect, in addition to this has Yemen a tradition of tribes who 
receive much legitimacy from the population. Again the strategy is based on the assumption that the 
local communities are willing to cooperate. However as a result of both the emphasis by AQAP on 
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anti-U.S. sentiment and the presence of civilian killing drones, the U.S. does not have a very positive 
image amongst the Yemenis. Adding to this is the overall sentiment that the foreign presence, 
highlights the lack of Yemenis to solve their own problems.  Furthermore, does the country lack 
sufficient institutions to effectively process the millions of dollars of donor aid.    
Therefore, I conclude with the notion that the Yemen model has failed in Yemen and should 
not be pursued again when the situation stabilizes or in any other country. Every country requires a 
fitted counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges and understands the dynamics of the country. The 
fact that AQAP is still present in Yemen, shows that after around 16 years of counterterrorism efforts, 
little has changed and the organizations has even grown. The revision of the strategy in Yemen in 
2009 seemed to bring hope to a more comprehensive structure. However, in practice little has been 
done to effectively target the root causes. The U.S. has been more active in targeting the ‘symptoms’ 
instead of the underlying causes contributing to AQAP’s appeal. Currently only the kinetic part of the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy is active in Yemen. Another point that I would like to conclude with is 
the presence of the United States in general. Thus far their strategy has failed and the continuing air 
strikes do no create more sympathy towards the U.S. In addition to this is it questionable what the 
U.S. can actually achieve in Yemen, as Phillips noted, only fundamental domestic restructuring of 
Yemen’s political structure will result in more stability.  
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